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Abstract 
This paper presents an experimental study on the ability of human groups to es-
cape the tragedy of the commons through institutional change. It shows that the 
groups identify institutional change as a means of resolving social dilemmas and 
are ready to apply it even if the change requires an unanimous vote. At the same 
time, the groups who were given the right to change the rules performed poorer 
on average than the control-groups. This result stands in contradiction to elemen-
tary economic reasoning as well as the results of previous experimental studies.  
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1. Introduction 
Since Hardin (1968)’s tragedy of the commons, social dilemmas have been on the 
research agenda of social science. Social dilemma situations typically appear 
when a number of individuals have free access to a scarce common pool re-
source (CPR) or when they have to provide a public good on basis of voluntary 
contributions (e.g., Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). In these cases, it is individually 
rational to make excessive use of the CPR respectively not to contribute any pri-
vate resources to the provision of the public good, in short to defect. Such defec-
tious behavior results in individual as well as overall welfare losses compared to a 
situation where all individuals cooperate. Previous research has shown that hu-
man societies face social dilemma situations in many fields of their economic life. 
At the same time, they have proved to be very creative in finding ways to resolve 
these dilemma situatons (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Heltberg, 2002). Following Messick 
and Brewer (1983), they apply two general categories of solutions. First, the indi-
viduals can use moral suasion and threats to convince each other to cooperate 
while leaving the institutional framework of their interaction unchanged. Alterna-
tively, they can try to change precisely this framework in order to alter the incen-
tive structure in a way that makes cooperative behavior individually rational.  
The applicability and effectiveness of these two options is the subject of numerous 
different studies. Recently, a number of authors have applied laboratory experi-
ment to contribute to this body of research. Depending on the options the players 
have in the experiment, two different types of experiments can be identified. The 
vast majority of experiments only allows the individual player to choose between 
different actions within a given set of rules. The primary objective of these single-
choice experiments is to find out to what extent individuals cooperate in social 
dilemma situations and what factors determine the degree of cooperation (e.g., 
Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984, 1994; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992). The 
second type of experiments will be called double-choice experiments. Like in sin-
gle-choice experiments, the individual players can choose between different ac-
tions. Additionally, the group of players as a whole can change the institutional 
restrictions on the individual choice of action. Double-choice experiments aim at 
answering the question under what circumstances institutional change is intro-
duced and whether this step improves efficiency. So far, only very few double-
choice experiments have been performed (e.g., Samuelson and Messick, 1986; 
Carpenter, 2000).  
This paper presents a newly designed double-choice experiment and reports on 
its results. Section 2 gives a short overview on previous experiments on human 
behaviour in social dilemma situations with a special focus on double-choice ex-
periments. Section 3 outlines the set-up of the experimental study presented in 
this paper. It differs from previous double-choice experiments in three central as-
 6 
pects. First, the teams are not given the chance to learn about the mechanisms of 
the game before being allowed to change the institutional settings. Second, the 
individuals are allowed to communicate. Third, the current experiment drops the 
assumption according to which institutional restrictions can be enforced at zero 
costs. Section 4 lays out the predictive theory. The results of the experiments are 
presented in section 5 and discussed in section 6. 
2. Previous experiments on social dilemma situations 
The number of single-choice experiments on social dilemma situations is large. 
They differ in some major characteristics of their set-up, such as group size, form 
and level of payoffs or the extent to which the players are allowed to communi-
cate. Most of them are so-called public good games, in which a group of individu-
als are given the task to provide a public good on the basis of voluntary contribu-
tions (e.g., Marvell and Ames, 1979; Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984, 1994; Pal-
frey and Prisbrey, 1997). In addition, some CPR-experiments are reported. These 
assemble a number of players around a CPR, which they have to cultivate (e.g., 
Gardner, Moore and Ostrom, 1987; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Walker et 
al., 2000). Regardless of their actual set-up, all single-choice experiments report 
an average degree of cooperation which is below the group-efficient degree but 
substantially above the one predicted by economic theory (e.g., Isaac, Walker and 
Thomas, 1984; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; 
Walker et al., 2000). The level of cooperation rises further if players are given the 
possibility to communicate (e.g., Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Weimann, 
1994) or to impose sanctions on defecting players (e.g., Chen and Plott, 1986; 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  
Compared to the numerous single-choice experiments, the number of double-
choice experiments is very small. One series of experiments on institutional 
choice was performed at the University of Santa Barbara and Groningen 
(Samuelson et al., 1984; Samuelson and Messick, 1986). Therein the subjects are 
told that they are part of a group of six individuals who cultivate a CPR over a 
number of rounds. In reality, they do not play in groups but every individual par-
ticipates in an isolated experiments in which the other members of the groups are 
simulated. In every round, the human player is informed about the initial pool size 
and is asked to state the amount of resource he wants to extract in this round. 
The player gets false feedback on the pool size. Three different structures are 
used. The overuse condition confronts the player with a pool which continuously 
and substantially shrinks over time. In the optimal use condition, the pool size 
does not decrease systematically but is only subject to small variations. Finally, 
the underuse condition presents the player a full pool at the end of every round. In 
all these conditions, the pool size does not depend on the extraction strategy of 
the human players, but is precisely determined beforehand. After ten rounds, the 
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first session of the experiment ends. The player is confronted with the (simulated) 
payoffs of all six group members. He is told that some group members have ex-
pressed the belief that they could have done better if they had restricted the ac-
cess to the common pool. Some players are given the opportunity to restrict the 
access by fully privatising the CPR before continuing to play (privatisation-
scenario). The institutional setting chosen depends on the choice of the human 
player. Other players are told that their co-players suggested to elect a leader who 
decides on the total harvest and its allocation to the group members (leadership-
scenario). If the human player votes in favor of this option, he is told that his co-
players have reached the same decision and furthermore elected him to be the 
leader. The game continues for another ten rounds.  
The results of the experiment can be summarized as follows (Samuelson et al., 
1984, S. 101). In part 1 of the experiment, the overuse condition led human play-
ers to extract significantly less from the common pool than under the other two 
conditions. The voting behavior in the beginning of part 2 also differed significantly 
between the conditions. While 66.7 % of the human players under the overuse 
condition voted for the institutional change, change were introduced only in 
25.4 % of the experiments under the other two conditions. Regardless of the con-
dition, the frequency of institutional change was higher under the leadership-
scenario (60.4 %) than under the privatisation-scenario (45.2 %). Unfortunately, 
neither Samuelson et al. (1984) nor Samuelson and Messick (1986) report on the 
performance in the second session of the game. Therefore it is impossible to say 
whether the changes in rules led to an increase in overall efficiency. 
A second series of experiments was performed by Sato (1987). Therein a group 
of four players cultivate an artificial forest over a number of periods. Before as well 
as during the experiment, the players do not know who their co-players are and 
are not given the opportunity to communicate with them. The experiment consists 
of twelve sessions. In the beginning of every session, the players plant a certain 
number of seedlings. As time proceeds, these small trees grow. The longer a tree 
grows, the larger it is and thus the greater the payoff of the player who harvests it. 
Harvesting is allowed by every player at any time. At the end of the session, the 
payoffs from harvesting are calculated and the costs for the seedlings are divided 
among the players. There are two different cost-allocation rules. A number of 
groups start off with the equality rule according to which the costs are shared 
equally among all players. Other groups play under the punishment-assigned rule 
which allocates the full costs to that one player with the highest payoff from har-
vesting trees. Each of the twelve sessions represents a new game starting with 
the same number of seedlings. Some groups perform the full twelve sessions un-
der one rule. Other groups are informed about both cost-allocation rules and the 
chance to change the initial rule in one of the later sessions of the experiment. In 
session 7 to 12, these groups are asked to vote on the rule under which they want 
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to play the current session. The previously active rule is changed if the majority of 
players vote in favor of change.  
Sato’s experiments delivered the following major results. In the first six sessions, 
the average payoff of groups under the punishment-assigned rule was distinctly 
higher than that under the equality rule. The difference in payoffs grew even larger 
because the groups under the first-named rule managed to increase their payoff 
over the sessions. In the later sessions their average payoff reached more than 
90 % of the maximum possible yield but remained below 50 % for the groups who 
played under the equality rule. Those groups who initially played under the equal-
ity rule and were given the chance to change the rule after round 6 installed the 
punishment-assigned rule in 46 of 54 sessions (85.2 %). Thereby they increased 
the average payoff substantially. After having learned about the functioning princi-
ples of this rule, they reached group payoffs of above 90 % of the maximum pos-
sible yield. Groups who started off under the punishment-assigned rule and had 
the possibility of changing the cost-allocation rule only made use of this possibility 
in 16 out of 54 sessions (29.6 %). As a result, their average payoff dropped sub-
stantially, reaching only 75 % of the maximum yield in the last round (Sato, 1987, 
S. 24 - 29).  
The third series of experiments to be presented here was performed by Carpenter 
(2000). Therein two players use a CPR together. Again, the players do not know 
their co-players and are not given the opportunity to communicate. Other than the 
experiments outlined above, Carpenter does not use a dynamic experimental set-
up. Instead, one session only consists of one round. The same pair of players 
plays a number of sessions. In every session, each player chooses whether he 
wants to extract a large or a small portion of the CPR. The initial payoff matrix re-
sembles a prisoners dilemma. In the last round, the players are given the chance 
to transform the payoff matrix by choosing a transformation parameter c. They 
can choose between six different matrices. All of them yield identical payoffs in 
those cases when both players cooperate but produce different payoffs in the 
case of defection. The lower the value of c, the stronger are the incentives to de-
fect. For the highest value of c = 1, no player can increase his return by defecting 
even if the other player cooperates. In the first rounds of Carpenter’s experiments, 
the level of defection was very high and thus the individual and group payoffs 
were low. When given the chance, 96 % of groups set c = 1 in the last round and 
thereby destroyed all incentives to defect. This led to a substantially higher level 
of cooperation and consequently higher payoffs in the final round (Carpenter, 
2000, S. 676 - 680).  
Summing up, the three double-choice experiments presented above place a 
group of players in a CPR environment and let them play a number of rounds un-
der a fixed set of rules. Thereby the players are given the chance to learn about 
the basic mechanisms of the game and try to resolve the social dilemma 
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without restricting the access to the CPR. As they are not allowed to communi-
cate, the success is limited. In the second part of the experiment, some groups 
are given the opportunity to change the rules of the game and play a number of 
further rounds. The results of these experiments can be summed up as follows: 
The degree of cooperation and thus the group payoff depends on the rules under 
which the groups made use of the CPR. Given the opportunity, a substantial 
number of groups made use of the right to change these rules. The willingness to 
change the rules strongly depends on the previous economic record. In those 
cases where the payoff in the first rounds was poor, the rules were changed in the 
vast majority of cases. As a result, the payoff increased. Those teams who 
reached high payoffs under the initial rules changed the rules less frequently. In a 
few cases, groups changed from a “good” to a “bad” rule, like those groups who 
abolished the punishment-assigned rule and introduced the equality rule in Sato’s 
study. This led to losses in payoff. On average, however, the payoffs reached af-
ter the players were given the opportunity of institutional change exceeded those 
reached in preceding rounds of the experiment. In sum, the presented double-
choice experiments support the following conclusion: Human individuals are able 
to escape social dilemma situations by changing the institutional framework of 
their interaction if they are given the opportunity. The possibility of institutional 
changes allows them to increase the efficiency of resource allocation to an extent 
that cannot be reached without this possibility.  
This paper provides a new double-choice experiment. The set-up differs from the 
preceding experiments in three fundamental characteristics. First, the groups 
which are allowed to change the rules are not given the opportunity to learn about 
the basic mechanisms of the game in a first part of the experiment under a fixed 
set of rules. Instead, institutional change is permitted from the first round on. Sec-
ond, communication is allowed throughout the entire game. This reduces the 
probability that some players do not comprehend the experimental set-up and the 
given incentives. At the same time, the groups are given the chance to resolve the 
social dilemma within the initially given set of rules rather than by changing the 
rules. Third, the current experiment drops the implicit assumption of the above 
experiments according to which the access to the CPR can be restricted at zero 
costs.
1
 In the following experiment, the enforcement of all rules that restrict ac-
cess to the CPR causes running costs.  
                                                 
1
  Samuelson et al. (1986) set the costs of preventing other players except the leader to use the 
resource in the leadership to zero. The players in Sato’s experiments do not have to spend any 
resources to observe the payoffs of their co-players or assign the costs for the seedlings. In 
Carpenter’s experiments, a change in the transformation parameter can destroy the incentives 
to defect without reducing the cooperative payoff. 
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3. Experimental set-up 
3.1 Rules 
The experiment is set up to resemble the following real-life background.
2
 Five 
families live of the fish they catch in a nearby lake and sell at the local market. For 
all families, fishing is the only source of income. Every family consists of three 
generations. Only the second generation engages in fishing and makes all the 
necessary decisions. After a certain time, this formerly active generation retires 
and hands over the right to fish and the equipment to the next generation. Pro-
vided that the lake is not depleted, the young generation will grant the retired gen-
eration a pension. Since the fish does not exist in abundance and reproduces only 
at a limited rate, a permanent flow of fish can only be guaranteed if each family 
catches less fish per period than it theoretically could. The families can organize 
the necessary fishing restriction by setting up a quota of fish every family is al-
lowed to catch. In order to enforce this quota, they can hire an independent patrol-
ling service. The higher the patrolling intensity, the higher the patrolling costs each 
family has to incur.  
The experiment is played by five players, each representing the active generation 
of one family. The aim of every player is to maximize his total income during the 
experiment. It consists of the money he can earn when selling his fish on the mar-
ket (1 $ per fish), minus the patrolling costs plus the pension. During the entire 
game, there are no restrictions on the communication between players. The fish-
ing will take seven rounds in total. Every player can catch as much as 2 000 fish 
per round. Initially, the lake contains 10 000 fish. At the beginning of every round, 
the teams have the possibility to install a quota which settles the number of fish 
they are allowed to fish in the current round. If three players agree on this quota, it 
is passed and violations will be punished – provided that the defecting players get 
caught. Before the fishing starts, the players can change the patrolling rule which 
sets the probability p of catching a player who tries to defect. Six different levels of 
patrolling can be chosen (see Table 1). The rule is changed if three/five players 
vote in favor of the new rule. Else the old rule remains active. Initially, the rule is 
set to rule 2.  
Next, every player decides on the number of fish he intends to catch. His fishing 
plans can be in accordance with the quota or deviate from it. Once all players 
                                                 
2
  Some authors do not present a real-life background story to avoid framing effects. The major 
advantage of embedding the incentive structure in a  real-life background is that it makes it 
much easier for the players to discuss their situation and possible solutions. In order to allow 
the groups to fully exploit the advantages of communication, the current experiment presents a 
real-life background.  
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have made their decision they declare their fishing plans to the organizer of the 
game. The competing players do not get to know each others’ fishing plans. If a 
player defects, his fishing success depends on whether he gets caught or not. For 
each attempt to defect, a random number processor is used to determine whether 
it is successful or not. If a player gets caught, he will receive no fish and his at-
tempt to defect will be publicly announced. Otherwise his fishing plans are not 
reduced and his defection is not be made public.  
Table 1: Patrolling rules, costs and probability of catching a defecting 
player 
Patrolling rule Patrolling costs (C) per player and round Probability P 
1 0 0 
2 50 0.25 
3 150 0.5 
4 250 0.6667 
5 450 0.85 
6 700 0.95 
 
The total demand for fish consists of the sum of fishing plans of the cooperative 
players plus the fishing plans of those defecting players who were successful in 
their attempts to defect. If the total demand for fish is smaller or equal to the con-
tents of the lake, every player (except for those who got caught defecting) will get 
the demanded amount of fish. If the total demand exceeds the amount of fish in 
the lake, all fish will be distributed among these players proportionally to their de-
mand. The final amount of fish left in the lake is announced. If the lake contains 
less than 500 fish, there will be no further fishing and thus the experiment ends 
here. Otherwise, the remaining number of fish is doubled to give the starting point 
of the next round. However, the number of fish cannot exceed 10 000. The fishing 
ends at the latest after seven rounds.  
In the eighths round, the players retire and are granted a pension. Every player 
will receive a single payment amounting to one quarter of the remaining number 
of fish in the beginning of round 8; at most $ 2 000. In round 8, the players do not 
have to incur any patrolling costs. The experiment ends here. The organizer in-
forms every player separately about his total income during the experiment. For 
every $ 1 000, a player is paid 1 EURO in cash. 
3.2 Participants 
In total, 20 experiments involving 100 students were performed. In six experi-
ments, the players were allowed to change the patrolling rule by simple majority 
vote (MAJ), in another six experiments an unanimous vote was necessary (UNA). 
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The remaining eight experiments served as control-group. Therein the players 
were neither allowed to nor informed about the possibility to change the patrolling 
intensity (FIX). The experiments were performed at the University of Giessen, 
Germany between October 2000 and November 2001 and involved 22 female and 
78 male students majoring in economics, who participated on a voluntary basis. In 
most cases, the players within one team knew each other by name. Yet the inten-
sity of personal contact between them, measured by the average number of co-
players that have visited each player, differed substantially across teams. With 
respect to the three different set-ups, no significant differences in the years of 
study or intensity of private contact were observed.  
4. Predictive theories 
This section will develop predictions concerning the behavior of the groups of stu-
dents in the experiment described above. Section 4.1 applies game-theoretic rea-
soning to predict the individual as well as group behavior in the three different set-
ups. In section 4.2, these predictions then analysed and modified or comple-
mented by taking into account evidence from experimental studies.  
4.1 Game theoretic predictions 
4.1.1 Quota-setting behavior 
The efficient fishing strategy for the group as a whole is to extract 5 000 fish in the 
first six rounds and 6 000 fish in the seventh round. This leaves 8 000 fish in the 
lake at the beginning of round 8 and therefore ensures the maximum pension of 
$ 2 000 for each player. The maximum total group earning is thus $ 46 000, which 
equals $ 9 200 per player. Every deviation from the described strategy will reduce 
the total group return. If undiscovered defection leads to over-fishing, the CPR 
can only recover if the quota is reduced in the next round. The optimal quota Q*, 
that is the quota that maximizes the total possible yield, is given by the following 
expression: 
 Q* = max {0; Ft - Rt}  
 where   Ft = number of fish in the lake in the beginning of round t 
Rt = 5 000 for t = 1 .... 6 
Rt = 4 000 for t = 7 
Assuming rational players, the teams can be expected to follow this method of 
quota-setting.  
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Prediction 1: All teams will follow the method described above when set-
ting their quota. 
4.1.2 Rule-setting behavior, defection and group payoff 
After the quota has been set, each player has to decide whether to comply to it or 
to try to extract more fish. The probability for a defecting player to get caught does 
not depend on the amount of fish he wants to catch in addition to the allowed 
quota. Hence: 
Prediction 2: Defecting players will try to extract the maximum possible 
number of 2 000 fish. 
Table 2: Simulated payoffs for different patrolling rules and levels of defec-
tion 
Individual payoff of player 1 for … defecting co-players 
(payoff calculated using a discount rate of 0.1 per round) 
Patrolling rule / 
player 1’s strat-
egy 0 1 2 3 4 
1 cooperate 9 200 
(6 386) 
5 731 
(4 527) 
2 240 
(2 094) 
1 571 
(1 514) 
1 222 
(1 200) 
1 defect 15 268 
(11 108) 
5 400 
(4 934) 
3 333 
(3 200) 
2 500 
(2 450) 
2 000 
(2 000) 
2 cooperate 8 850 
(6 125) 
6 698 
(4 780) 
3 352 
(2 820) 
2 140 
(1 952) 
1 789 
(1 673) 
2 defect 11 682 
(8 383) 
7 071 
(5 684) 
4 029 
(3 596) 
3 104 
(2 869) 
2 514 
(2 384) 
3 cooperate 8 150 
(5 604) 
6 245 
(4 326) 
5 475 
(3 964) 
3 813 
(2 928) 
3 574 
(2 833) 
3 defect 7 662 
(5 341) 
6 856 
(4 894) 
5 175 
(3 909) 
4 302 
(3 358) 
3 522 
(2 861) 
4 cooperate 7 450 
(5 082) 
5 917 
(4 037) 
6 376 
(4 396) 
5 487 
(3 820) 
5 779 
(4 065) 
4 defect 4 750 
(3 147) 
4 691 
(3 115) 
4 384 
(2 941) 
4 169 
(2 816) 
3 966 
(2 714) 
5 cooperate 6 050 
(4 039) 
5 196 
(3 451) 
5 867 
(3 917) 
5 653 
(3 768) 
5 936 
(3 963) 
5 defect 858 
(227) 
922 
(268) 
892 
(242) 
936 
(277) 
976 
(299) 
6 cooperate 4 300 
(2 734) 
3 985 
(2 517) 
4 279 
(2 720) 
4 255 
(2 704) 
4 297 
(2 732) 
6 defect -2 230 
(-2 088) 
-2 190 
(-2 062) 
-2 205 
(-2 069) 
-2 208 
(-2 074) 
-2 197 
(-2 065) 
 
Under the initial rule, the probability of getting caught when defecting is 0.25. Thus 
any player can increase his expected short-term payoff by defecting. Due to the 
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stochastic nature of the game, the expected long-term payoff from defection can-
not be calculated exactly. Table 2 contains estimates for the payoffs from coop-
eration and defection that an individual player can expect for different patrolling 
intensities and co-players’ behavior. These estimates represent the average pay-
offs of 10 000 simulated experiments per constellation. Teams are assumed to 
satisfy prediction 1 in their quota-setting behavior. Two different estimates are 
presented. While the first figure represents the sum of all payoffs throughout the 
experiment, the payoffs in parenthesis are discounted using the rate of 0.1 per 
round. Discounting accounts for the fact that, given the danger of resource extinc-
tion, the payoffs become increasingly uncertain the later in the experiment they 
are expected to occur. The discount factor thus represents the rate of time prefer-
ence due to uncertainty. The simulated payoffs in Table 2 show that for rule 2, 
defection represents the strictly dominant strategy. Hence rational players can be 
expected to defect under the initially installed patrolling intensity. At the same 
time, the simulation results clearly show that collective defection reduces the ex-
pected payoff by 71.6 % from $ 8 850 to $ 2 513 per capita. In order to avoid 
these losses, the players must try to convince or force each other to cooperate.  
MAJ and UNA teams can destroy the incentives to defect by increasing the patrol-
ling intensity. Rule of thumb calculations indicate that, under rule 3 (P = 0.5), a 
risk-neutral player cannot expect any short-term gains from defection, as the ex-
pected payoff is equal to the certain payoff in the case of cooperation. Among 
risk-averse players, rule 3 is sufficient to induce cooperative behavior. Yet the 
structure of payoffs in table 2 indicates that any cooperative equilibrium under rule 
3 remains fragile. Especially when assuming a positive rate of time preference, 
any rational player is better off if he defects as soon as he expects one or more of 
his co-players to defect. The patrolling intensity of rules 4 to 6 is sufficient to de-
stroy all short- as well as long-term incentives to defect. Among these three rules, 
rule 4 induces a stable cooperative equilibrium at the lowest patrolling costs. By 
setting rule 4, MAJ and UNA teams can thus expect a certain payoff of $ 7 450 
per player. This sum represents a benchmark for these teams.  
Prediction 3: At minimum, MAJ and UNA teams will achieve a net return 
of $ 7 450 per person. 
However, if rule 4 is introduced in the first round, each player has to incur patrol-
ling costs of $ 1 750, which is equivalent to 19.0 % of the gross income he ex-
pects to earn during the experiment. Therefore MAJ and UNA teams may try to 
save these costs at least in parts by using other mechanisms than increasing the 
patrolling intensity to induce cooperative behavior. Threats may be a suitable in-
strument for this purpose. MAJ and UNA teams can apply the same types of 
threats as FIX teams. First, they can threaten to set an inefficiently high quota for 
the rounds following defection. Any higher quota will surely further reduce the ex-
pected income of both defecting and cooperative players. Therefore the 
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corresponding threat lacks credibility. Second, the other players can threaten to 
react by changing from cooperative behavior to defection. In this case, they follow 
a strategy of loss minimization or “catch as catch can”. The CPR will be depleted 
very quickly, destroying the prospect of future fishing income as well as the pen-
sion. As long as the cooperative players see a chance for the CPR to recover, a 
change from cooperation to defection is irrational. The corresponding threat is 
thus not credible either. Consequently, FIX teams do not have any effective in-
struments to destroy the incentives to defect. Hence: 
Prediction 4: FIX teams will witness a significantly higher frequency of de-
fection than MAJ and UNA teams. 
Prediction 5: FIX teams will not be able to preserve the CPR from extinc-
tion.  
Other than FIX teams, MAJ and UNA teams can apply an additional third type of 
threat to induce cooperative behavior. They may threaten to vote for a higher pa-
trolling intensity if one or more player defect. As the costs of this reaction are 
moderate and the benefits are substantial, players can credibly threaten to install 
a high patrolling rule once defectious behavior occurs.
3
 This threat is, however, 
not sufficient to destroy the incentives to defect. Assume that the group agreed to 
install rule 1 for a start. In this case, a defecting player can earn $ 2 000 instead of 
$ 1 000 by defecting. If, in the next round, a higher patrolling rule is set, his future 
income is reduced by the additional patrolling costs. These are higher, the more 
rounds are left. In addition, the increased patrolling intensity will make it less prof-
itable for him to defect in the next rounds. If he complies to the quota, he can earn 
only $ 600 instead of $ 1 000 in the round following his defection. After that, a 
gross fishing income of $ 1 000 is feasible again. Hence his net gain from defec-
tion in round t is given by the following formula: 
 Net gain = 600 – ∆CR x (7 - (t+1)) 
where ∆CR represents the change in patrolling costs per round. 
For any player who expects one or more of his co-players to defect, ∆CR = 0, be-
cause the patrolling intensity will be increased regardless of his own action. Thus 
he faces massive incentives to defect. Now consider the case where the individual 
                                                 
3
  Even the player who defected in the previous round has the same interest in a higher rule as 
the rest of the group. By changing the rule he reduces the danger that the CPR is deplete due 
to defection of other players. The fact that he makes his own defection in the future less profit-
able only comes to a minor disadvantage and is outweighed by the increase in expected in-
come from avoiding extinction. In sum, the obstacles for a change in patrolling intensity are 
moderate. 
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player expects all his co-players to comply to the quota. Assuming rule 3 is set as 
a reaction to defection, defecting pays if there are less than 4 rounds left to play. 
If, however, players realize that under rule 1, defection is rational in rounds 4-6, 
they must introduce a higher patrolling rule in the beginning of round 4 to effec-
tively fight defection. As a result, the net gain from defecting in round 3 equals 
$ 600, as ∆CR = 0. Hence control has to be introduced in round 3. If this is again 
anticipated, a player can try to increase his income by defecting in round 2. In the 
end, this line of reasoning leads to the following prediction: 
Prediction 6: MAJ and UNA teams will introduce patrolling rule 3 or higher 
in round 1. 
4.2 Evidence from earlier experiments 
When predicting human behavior, game-theorists often overestimate the cognitive 
capacities of the players and/or their willingness to use them (e.g., Anderson, Go-
erree and Holt, 1998). In the current experiment, the optimal fishing strategy –at 
least for round 1 to 6 – is easy to identify. As the players have to discuss it openly 
before settling the quota, they can be expected to recognize and set the optimal 
quota as predicted in prediction 1. Thus the evidence from preceding experiments 
does not cast any doubt on the tenability this prediction. At the same time, it is 
much more complicated to estimate the expected payoffs under different rules 
(see Table 2). Rule-of-thumb calculations can, however, help the player to find out 
that, on average, defection does not increase the payoff if the probability of getting 
caught is 50 % or higher (i.e. under rule 3 to 6) but brings substantial additional 
payoffs, at least in the short-run, under rule 1. For the initial rule 2, rule of thumb 
calculations will return a moderate incentive to defect. In sum, the rough incentive 
structure of monetary incentives should be clear to the players.  
Whether rule 3 is sufficient to induce cooperative behavior in MAJ and UNA teams 
depends on the players’ attitude towards risk as well as their attraction to chance 
(e.g., Albers et al., 2000). In different series of lottery experiments, Holt and Laury 
(2000, 2000a) found that the experimentees were on average risk-averse regard-
less of whether they faced low or high, real or hypothetical payoffs. On the other 
hand, participants of experiments tend to systematically overestimate their own 
chance of winning in lotteries (e.g., Camerer 1995; Thaler 1991). In addition, 
Albers et al. (2000) showed in a series of experiments that the attraction to 
chance is an independent and positive source of utility for people having to 
choose between a certain payoff and a lottery. In sum, the results of lottery ex-
periments give no clear answer to the question whether rule 3 will be sufficient to 
induce cooperation in MAJ and UNA teams. 
Game-theoretic reasoning systematically underestimates the level of voluntary 
cooperation in social dilemma games. This is especially true in those cases, 
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where players are allowed to communicate (e.g., Ostrom, Walker, Gardner, 1992; 
Weimann, 1994). This behavior can partly result from a general predisposition to 
cooperate and a preference for fair results  (e.g., Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In the current experiment, the quota is not only 
discussed but formally voted on. This makes the quota more binding (e.g., Van-
berg, 1988) and can thus further increase the degree of cooperation. Therefore 
defection can be expected to be less frequent than predicted in section 4.1 even if 
the patrolling intensity is low. This in turn casts doubt on prediction 4 and predic-
tion 6. At the same time, previous single choice experiments have shown a termi-
nation effect, that is a substantial though not full deterioration of cooperative be-
havior in the last round (e.g., Weimann, 1994; Ledyard, 1995; Ehrhart, 1997, 
S. 49 - 52). This leads to prediction 7: 
Prediction 7: FIX teams will witness a significant increase in defection in 
the last round.  
Consequently, the CPR is in danger of extinction, giving support to prediction 5.
4
 
A common result of all experiments on social dilemma situations is that players 
very seldom choose extreme actions, even if these are rational. Especially in pub-
lic good experiments, very few players contribute all private resources or none of 
them to the provision of the public good (e.g., Anderson, Goerree and Holt, 1998). 
Warm-glow effects are found to be one determinant of the players’ attraction to 
“moderate defection” (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997). Assum-
ing that the players in the current experiment are guided by the same motives, 
defecting players may abstain from extracting the maximum possible 2 000 fish. 
This casts doubt on the tenability of prediction 2. 
Finally, all experimental studies report a very wide dispersion of group behavior. 
In single choice experiments, some groups are found to cooperate in the vast ma-
jority of cases, while others show extensive defection (e.g., Isaac, Walker and 
Thomas, 1984, 1994; Gardner, Moore and Walker, 1997). As these teams are 
placed in an identical environment with identical incentives, the different degrees 
of cooperation observed must be caused by differences in group characteristics, 
such as the players’ attitude towards risk or their preference for fairness. While 
                                                 
4
  Experiments have furthermore shown that the degree of cooperation is higher if players are 
given the opportunity to punish their defecting co-players. The players are willing to punish de-
fecting players even if this caused substantial private costs (e.g., Chen and Plott, 1987; Frey 
and Bohnet, 1995; Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In the current experiment, the players do not have 
the possibility to formally punish single players. They cannot effectively apply informal sanc-
tions either because they do not know who defected as long as the defecting players do not get 
caught. In sum, sanctioning cannot help the teams to induce cooperation. 
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some teams are able to reach a cooperative solution under the given set of rules, 
the same rules prove inappropriate for other teams. In single-choice experiments, 
the latter type of team will perform poorly because it does not have a suitable in-
strument at hand to resolve the social dilemma. Teams in double-choice experi-
ments, on the other hand, are given a suitable instrument as they are allowed to 
change the rules, if this proves necessary. As a result, the average economic per-
formance in double-choice experiments can be expected to be higher than in oth-
erwise identical single-choice experiments. The evidence from the experiments by 
Sato (1987) and Carpenter (2000) support this conclusion. Furthermore, the eas-
ier it is for a team to change the rules, the more successful it can be expected to 
be. In the context of the current experiment, these considerations lead to a final 
prediction
5
: 
Prediction 8: MAJ teams will reach the highest average payoff, followed 
by UNA teams. The average payoff under both set-ups will exceed the 
one reached by FIX teams. 
5. Results 
5.1 Quota-setting behavior 
All teams passed quotas in all rounds. In 89.9% (80.0% in the MAJ, 95.2% in the 
UNA and 92.9% in the FIX set-up) the quota was passed in an unanimous vote. In 
round 1 to 6, 88.2 % of all quotas were set in accordance with prediction 1. Re-
gardless of the set-up, all teams set the efficient quota of 1 000 fish per capita in 
round 1, thereby clearly indicating that they identified the group-efficient fishing 
strategy. As long as the number of fish did not drop below 10 000 in round 1 to 6, 
81 out of 82 quotas were set efficiently. In those situations where the lake con-
tained less than 10 000 fish, 65 % of the quotas were set according to prediction 
1. All deviations from the efficient quota led to over-fishing. In round 7, 14 out of 
19 teams realized that a higher quota has to be set. Four teams continued to har-
                                                 
5
  This prediction is also backed by theoretical considerations following the evolutionary ap-
proach. These show that the economic success of a group of individuals exploiting a CPR cru-
cially depends on the composition of the group. Only if the share of individuals who have a 
strong preference for the cooperative solution is sufficiently large, will these be rewarded by 
above-average payoffs and rationally stick to their cooperative strategy. If, however, the popu-
lation contains fewer so-called cooperators, they will reach below-average payoffs and thus 
vanish or change to defection (e.g., Sethi and Samanathan, 1996). Institutional change is the 
only possibility to escape the tragedy of the commons in this case. As only MAJ and UNA 
teams are given this opportunity, only they can reach a cooperative solution regardless of the 
share of cooperators within them, while FIX teams can only expect a cooperative solution in 
those cases when the share of cooperators is sufficiently large.  
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vest 5 000 fish from a lake of 10 000, while only one teams slightly over-fished an 
already decimated population. In total, 86.2 % of all quotas were set efficiently. In 
sum, the experimental evidence gives strong support for prediction 1.
6
  
5.2 Rule-setting behavior and defection 
After setting a quota, MAJ and UNA teams have to decide about the patrolling 
intensity. In the beginning of the game, six of these teams abolished patrolling 
completely, four left the rule unchanged and only two teams introduced rule 3 (see 
Table 3).  
Table 3: Patrolling rule and intensity in MAJ and UNA groups 
Round Group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Average 
patrolling 
intensity 
MAJ_1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 
MAJ_2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 50.0 
MAJ_3 2 3 3 2 2   35.0 
MAJ_4 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 32.1 
MAJ_5 1 2 3 3 2 3 2 32.1 
MAJ_6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 
Av. patrolling intensity  16.7 29.2 33.3 20.8 16.7 30.0 25.0 24.5 
UNA_1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 
UNA_2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 10.7 
UNA_3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.0 
UNA_4 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 57.4 
UNA_5 2 4 4 3 3 2 3 51.2 
UNA_6 2 2 1 3 3 3 3 35.7 
Av. patrolling intensity 20.8 23.6 19.5 25.0 29.2 30.8 32.0 25.8 
 
Only three ballots for a stricter rule were called but none were passed. Predic-
tion 6 does thus not prove tenable. All 12 teams which had the right to change the 
patrolling rule made use of this right at least once during the experiment. Three 
MAJ and two UNA teams changed the patrolling rules in the first round and stuck 
to the newly introduced rule throughout the entire experiment. Four of these 
teams chose rule 1, while one MAJ team chose rule 3. The other teams changed 
the rule more frequently, at most 5 times. The strictest patrolling rule implemented 
                                                 
6
  The efficiency of rule setting is not found to differ between set-ups. The fact that the overall 
frequency of efficient quotas was slightly higher in FIX teams results from the fact that these 
teams faced a full lake more frequently than MAJ and UNA teams.  
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was rule 5. The average patrolling intensity throughout the entire game – meas-
ured by the probability of discovering defection – was 24.5 % for MAJ and 25.8 % 
for UNA teams and thereby came very close to the patrolling intensity of rule 2 
under which FIX teams were forced to play. 
MAJ teams called on 23 ballots with 14 of them being passed. Under the UNA 
set-up, 41 ballots on changing the rules were called and 12 of them were passed. 
As predicted in section 4.2, players in the UNA set-up faced higher obstacles 
when trying to introduce their preferred patrolling rule. Yet the difference in restric-
tion compared to the MAJ set-up is moderate, since all UNA teams were able to 
change the patrolling intensity and in two cases even introduced stricter rules than 
the MAJ teams did. In OLS regressions, neither the average patrolling intensity 
nor the intensity set in round 1 is found to depend on the ascertained group char-
acteristics, i.e. the number of semesters, the share of female players or the inten-
sity of pre-game contact between team members. The corresponding coefficients 
of correlations never exceed 0.32. 
MAJ teams increased the patrolling intensity six times and lowered it four times, 
UNA teams five respectively four times. In both set-ups the lowest average rule 
per round was observed in round 1. When looking at those seven teams who 
changed the rule beyond round 1, only two of them reduced the patrolling intensity 
beyond the level of round 1 during the experiment. At the same time, all of them 
played under stricter patrolling at least once during the experiment. Tracing the 
rule-changing behavior beyond the first round reveals no systematic pattern for 
MAJ teams but a significant increase in patrolling intensity for UNA teams. The 
Spearman’s coefficients of correlation between the round number and the aver-
age patrolling intensity takes on the values of 0.07 respectively 0.89.  
The average number of defections per round was 0.79 for MAJ, 0.76 for UNA 
compared to only 0.64 for FIX teams (see Table 4). This result stands in sharp 
contradiction to prediction 4. The teams in the MAJ and UNA set-up were not able 
to use the right to change the patrolling intensity to reduce defection. When trac-
ing defection across rounds, no termination effect was observed in FIX teams. 
Thus prediction 7 does not prove tenable either. In 46.5 % of all attempts to defect 
(57.6 % in the MAJ, 50.0 % in the UNA and 33.3 % in the FIX set-up), players 
planned to extract less than the maximum possible amount of 2 000 fish. In some 
cases, the fishing plans exceeded the quota by no more than 10 %.
7
 This behav-
ior clearly violates the aim of payoff maximization underlying prediction 2. In addi-
tion, teams who played under a low patrolling rule did not, on average, witness 
more defection than teams playing under a high patrolling intensity. In particular, 
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  This behavior was especially frequent in the FIX_3 team and explains why this team was able 
to save the CPR from extinction despite the low patrolling intensity and 17 attempts to defect.  
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those four teams who played all rounds without any patrolling did not witness 
more defectious behavior than the other MAJ and UNA teams.  
Table 4: Group characteristics and group performance  
group average 
patrol-
ling 
intensity 
group  
pension 
net  group 
payoff 
number 
of de-
fections 
changes 
in rule 
Average 
number of 
semester 
average 
number of 
visits 
number of 
female 
players 
MAJ_1 0.0 8 000 44 800 1 1 7.00 3.40 0 
MAJ_2 50.0 10 000 44 950 0 1 5.40 2.80 2 
MAJ_3 35.0 0 23 350 9 2 7.20 2.40 2 
MAJ_4 32.1 2 400 29 510 14 4 1.00 2.60 1 
MAJ_5 32.1 5 250 29 750 9 5 4.20 2.00 1 
MAJ_6 0.0 10 000 46 000 0 1 11.20 0.80 2 
Average 24.5 5 941.67 36 393.33 5.50 2.33 6.00 2.33 1.33 
UNA_1 0.0 9 950 41 420 7 1 9.00 3.40 0 
UNA_2 10.7 10 000 43 060 4 1 9.80 0.00 2 
UNA_3 0.0 10 000 46 000 1 1 5.00 3.00 0 
UNA_4 57.4 10 000 36 490 12 3 7.20 2.40 0 
UNA_5 51.2 10 000 40 150 4 4 6.00 0.60 1 
UNA_6 35.7 10 000 39 370 4 2 6.20 1.20 2 
Average 25.8 9 991.67 41 081.67 5.33 2 7.20 1.77 0.83 
FIX_1 25.00 10 000 36 050 9  9.40 2.00 0 
FIX_2 25.00 10 000 45 649 0  2 2.80 1 
FIX_3 25.00 6 000 40 628 17  7.40 1.00 2 
FIX_4 25.00 10 000 44 647 1  7.60 2.00 0 
FIX_5 25.00 10 000 43 846 2  10.40 0.20 3 
FIX_6 25.00 10 000 43 545 2  7.00 3.20 0 
FIX_7 25.00 7 900 41 304 5  7.60 0.00 1 
FIX_8 25.00 10 000 44 643 0  1.00 2.40 2 
Average 25.00 9 237.50 42 539 4.50  6.55 1.70 1.13 
 
The rule-changing behavior beyond the first round was significantly influenced by 
the intensity of defection in the preceding round. All 11 increases in patrolling in-
tensity beyond round 1 followed a round in which at least one player defected, 
while rounds with 100 % cooperation were never followed by an increase in rule. 
Those eight cases in which the patrolling intensity was reduces are less straight-
forward to interpret. Only three of these changes were preceded by full coopera-
tion in the previous round. In five cases, the patrolling intensity was reduced de-
spite prior defection. The players agreed to set a very low quota even though this 
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step increased the incentives to defect massively especially because they simul-
taneously set a low quota to give the CPR a chance to recover. The intra-group 
conversation revealed the following justification for this step: Some players argued 
in favor of the reduced patrolling intensity because otherwise the patrolling costs 
would exceed the fishing income in that round. The teams followed this course of 
argumentation and intensified moral suasion to induce cooperative behavior.  
5.3 Economic performance 
As illustrated in table 5, only very few teams were able to keep the pool at its 
original size of 10 000 fish throughout the first six rounds as would have been effi-
cient. At the same time, the degree of reduction in stock differed for the three set-
ups.  
Table 5: Common pool size at the beginning of round 2 to 7 
Pool size at the beginning of round  
group 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
MAJ_1 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
MAJ_2 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
MAJ_3 10 000 10 000 2 000 5 600   
MAJ_4 9 200 7 900 9 200 2 400 4 780 5 960 
MAJ_5 6 600 6 400 6 800 9 600 2 000 3 000 
MAJ_6 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
Average 9 300 9 050 8 000 7 933.33 7 356 7 792 
UNA_1 10 000 9 000 9 600 9 300 7 600 5 400 
UNA_2 10 000 8 000 9 200 9 280 10 000 8 000 
UNA_3 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
UNA_4 8 000 9 600 10 000 9 000 4 600 9 200 
UNA_5 6 000 8 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 8 000 
UNA_6 8 000 6 400 9 760 10 000 10 000 10 000 
Average 8 666,67 8 500 9 760 9 596,67 8 700 8 433,33 
FIX_1 8 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 000 8 000 
FIX_2 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
FIX_3 9 600 10 000 9 200 10 000 10 000 10 000 
FIX_4 10 000 10 000 10 000 10000 10 000 10 000 
FIX_5 10 000 8 000 10 000 10 000 8 000 8 400 
FIX_6 10 000 10 000 9 800 10 000 10 000 10 000 
FIX_7 10 000 10 000 10 000 8 000 8 400 9 800 
FIX_8 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 
Average 9 600 9 666,67 9 857,14 9 714,29 8 914,29 9 457,14 
 
 23 
Three out of the six MAJ teams reduced the stock below 4 000 fish, while neither 
UNA nor FIX teams trespassed this mark. At any round, the average stock of fish 
of FIX teams exceeded the average stock of MAJ and UNA teams. Except for one 
MAJ team, all teams managed to keep the pool of fish from extinction. Only two 
MAJ teams left sufficient fish in the lake to be granted the maximum possible pen-
sion, while the other MAJ teams had to incur losses in pensions up to 75 % (re-
spectively 100 %). On the other hand, all UNA teams and six out of eight FIX 
teams reached the full pension. The pensions of MAJ teams are significantly 
smaller than those of UNA 25 teams (α= 0.05) as well as the FIX teams (α= 0.1). 
At the same time, no difference was found between UNA and FIX teams. The 
above-average performance of FIX teams stands in sharp contradiction to predic-
tion 5. 
MAJ teams achieved net payoffs ranging from $ 23 350 to the maximum possible 
yield of $ 46 000, with an average of $ 36 393. UNA teams performed better on 
average ($ 41 083), with payoffs ranging between $ 36 490 and $ 46 000. Three 
MAJ and one UNA teams ended up with a group payoff that was below the one 
they could have expected when setting rule 4 ($ 37 250). This result stands in 
sharp contradiction to prediction 3. The FIX teams reached payoffs between 
$ 36 050 and $ 45 659 and performed best on average ($ 42 539). Their net pay-
off is significantly larger than for MAJ teams(α = 0.1). This result strongly contra-
dicts prediction 8. OLS-regressions show that the differences in economic per-
formance do not result from differences in the ascertained group characteristics. 
All corresponding coefficients of correlation were smaller than 0.3. Those four 
teams which introduced rule 1 in the first round and stuck to it reached an average 
payoff of $ 44 555. The group payoff of the team which played the entire experi-
ment under rule 3 amounted to $ 44 950. These five teams achieved higher payoff 
than the average FIX teams as predicted in section 4. Teams with more frequent 
changes in patrolling intensity only earned an average of $ 34 590 ($ 27 537 for 
MAJ teams and $ 39 880 for UNA teams), which is substantially less than the av-
erage payoff of FIX teams. An OLS regression for MAJ and UNA teams between 
the number of changes in rules and the net payoff produced a significantly nega-
tive slope (α = 0.05; R2 = 0.424). 
6. Discussion  
All groups, regardless of whether they were allowed to change the institutional 
settings or not, witnessed a degree of cooperation throughout the entire game that 
substantially exceeded the one predicted by game theory. In this respect, the re-
sults of the current experimental study stands in line with previous experiments on 
social dilemma situations. In those cases where defection occurred, the players in 
almost 50 % of the cases extracted less than the maximum possible 2 000 fish. 
This result suggests that the corresponding players wanted to defect without 
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heavily diminishing the CPR in the case of success. This behavior supports the 
notion put forth by Albers et al. (2000), who suggest that the mere existence of 
chance constitutes a source of positive utility which is independent of the structure 
of payoffs. 
As a consequence of the high degree of cooperation, the groups, especially FIX 
teams, reached higher payoffs than predicted. Regarding the low average patrol-
ling intensity, two explanations seem possible. First, the players were guided by a 
predisposition to cooperate. This would also explain the missing termination effect 
in FIX teams. Second, the possibility to communicate allowed them to success-
fully use moral suasion and threats to reduce defection. Therefore, compared to 
the players in previous double-choice experiments who were not allowed to com-
municate, teams in the current experiment had to rely less heavily on externally 
enforced institutional restrictions. This may explain why FIX teams in the current 
study were much more successful than the teams in previous experimental stud-
ies as long as they were not allowed to install an efficient set of rules.  
Like in previous double-choice experiments, the groups made frequent use of the 
right to change the institutional settings. In the current experiment, all teams which 
were allowed to change the institutional settings made use of this possibility at 
least once during the experiment. This gives further support to the notion that hu-
man individuals regard institutional change as a method of dissolving social di-
lemma situations. At the same time it shows that the majority rule and even una-
nimity only pose moderate obstacles for institutional change. This result supports 
Brennan and Buchanan (1985) who argue that groups of human individuals man-
age to introduce institutional change even under unanimity rule if the proposed 
rules are considered fair. 
In one central aspect, the results of the current experiment do, however, stand in 
sharp contrast to those of previous double-choice experiments. Other than the 
teams in the experiments performed by Sato (1987) and Carpenter (2000), the 
MAJ and UNA teams in the current experiment were not able to capitalize the 
right to change the institutional settings. Instead of having a positive impact on the 
average payoff, the additional option that these teams had compared to FIX 
teams reduced the average payoff. This result heavily contradicts the wisdom of 
textbooks on the economic theory of decision making. These state that an addi-
tional option never reduces the payoff of an economic agent, at worst it leaves the 
payoff unchanged. Neither a lack in self-control (e.g., Thaler, 1991, S. 77 - 90) nor 
problems of self-commitment (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, S. 74 - 77) can 
explain why the additional option led to losses in average payoffs.
8
 As, on aver-
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  In addition, none of the players in MAJ and UNA teams expressed any discontent about the 
fact that they were given the right to change the rules. 
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age, MAJ and UNA teams played under the same patrolling intensity as FIX 
teams, excessive patrolling costs cannot serve as an explanation either.  
The author can offer the following explanation for this puzzling result. In the ex-
periments of Sato (1987) and Carpenter (2000), all groups had played a number 
of rounds under a fixed set of rules. During these rounds, they had the opportunity 
to learn about the social dilemma situation and the behavior of their co-players. 
And only after they had learned about the functioning of the game under a given 
set of rules, they were allowed to change the rules and learn about the functioning 
of different rules. In the current experiment, MAJ and UNA teams had the right to 
change the rules from the very beginning of the game. The teams had to find the 
“correct” rule in a trial and error process without any experience from earlier 
rounds. Some teams managed to pick the patrolling rule which was suitable to 
induce cooperation in their particular case in the first round. Other teams chose an 
insufficiently low rule. The negatively significant relationship between the fre-
quency of changes in rule and net payoff clearly indicates the following: The 
longer the process of trial and error, the lower the payoffs. The frequency of 
changes in patrolling intensity proved to be a negative function of the number of 
semesters the students have studied (α = 0.05). This indicates that experienced 
teams have accumulated knowledge in economic reasoning which makes it pos-
sible for them to better comprehend the functioning of the experiment a priori than 
groups of inexperienced students.  
Regarding the lack of experience, all teams took a high risk at the beginning of the 
game when they introduced very low patrolling rules. The question that needs to 
be answered is why they took this high risk even though their knowledge on the 
mechanism of the game and their co-players’ behavior was very limited? Possibly, 
the players did not consider the low patrolling intensity a risk because they over-
estimated the predisposition of their co-players to cooperate. Such “wishful think-
ing” is reported especially for players who are themselves predisposed to cooper-
ate (Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram, 1996). This “wishful thinking” may have 
been strengthened by the fact that the quota was passed unanimously in the 
overwhelming number of cases and was therefore regarded as an agreement of 
compliance. Another explanation is that calling for a ballot as well as voting for 
intensive patrolling can be interpreted as a declaration of ex ante mistrust. This 
can destroy an initial climate of trust and predisposition to coordination and 
thereby increase the co-players’ readiness to defect. In addition, the implicit decla-
ration of mistrust may be unpopular among players who know each other. Follow-
ing this line of argumentation, even players who were uncertain whether the low 
patrolling intensity will be sufficient faced an incentive not to voice their doubts. A 
strong antipathy to pay for patrolling may serve as a further explanation for the 
low patrolling intensity MAJ and UNA teams set at the beginning of the experi-
ment. This reluctance was openly expressed by teams who were confronted with 
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a substantial degree of defection but failed to intensify the patrolling intensity. As 
the previous experiments by Sato (1987) and Carpenter (2000) did not account for 
costs of enforcing institutions, the players in their experiments were more readily 
willing to impose heavy restrictions on the access to the CPR.  
7.  Conclusion  
Since Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, social dilemma situations have been sub-
ject of numerous theoretical and empirical articles. Therein institutional change 
was identified to be a very important measure to resolve the social dilemma situa-
tion and reach efficient results. So far, only very few experimental studies have 
been performed to investigate the ability of groups of human individuals to apply 
this measure effectively. This paper presents a newly designed double-choice 
experiment that can give further insight into the human behavior in situations of 
institutional choice. It differs from preceding double-choice experiments in three 
fundamental features. First, the players are not given the opportunity to learn 
about the basic mechanisms of the game before being allowed to change the in-
stitutional settings. Second, they are allowed to communicate. Third, the experi-
mental set-up accounts for the costs of enforcing institutional restrictions on the 
access to the CPR. 
The major result of the current experimental study can be summarized as follows. 
Like in most experiments on social dilemma situations, the degree of voluntary 
cooperation was substantially higher than predicted by game theory. Under mod-
erate patrolling, the FIX teams, who were not allowed to change the institutions, 
reached near-efficient results. Thereby the performed far better than the control-
groups of previous double-choice experiments. This result underlines the promi-
nent role of communication in resolving social dilemma situations. The experiment 
furthermore clearly shows that those groups who were allowed to change the 
rules of their interaction made use of this opportunity to try to resolve the social 
dilemma situation. This indicates that humans regard institutional change as an 
appropriate means of influencing the economic outcome according to their prefer-
ences. On the other hand, MAJ and UNA teams reached payoffs which were on 
average lower than those of the control groups, who were not given the right to 
change the rules. Following elementary economic reasoning, the opposite result 
could have been expected. Though the author offers a first plausible explanation 
for this puzzling result, this result casts doubt on the ability of human individuals to 
correctly predict the impact of institutional change on human behavior and eco-
nomic outcomes. This in turn suggests that the capability of groups of human indi-
viduals to apply institutional change to resolve social dilemma situations is limited. 
Despite giving new insight into this interesting field of research, the current ex-
periment clearly shows that far more double-choice experiments are necessary to 
substantially improve our knowledge of this topic.  
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